








Model-based runtime veriﬁcation is an extension to the state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation, aimed at check-
ing at runtime the system implementation against the system model (consistency checking) and the system
model against the system speciﬁcation (safety checking). Notice that our runtime veriﬁcation works at the
model level, thus, we do not need to strictly synchronize this runtime veriﬁcation with the system execu-
tion. In fact, we mainly use the runtime information (current states) obtained from the system execution
to reduce the state space (of the system model) to be explored. It means that this model-based runtime
veriﬁcation might run before or after the system execution, i.e., switch alternately between a preventive
pre-checking mode and a maintaining post-checking mode. In order to make it run ahead of the system
execution for as long time as possible, we present two possible strategies so that this runtime veriﬁcation
can selectively reduce the state space (of the system model) to be explored by making the system model
enriched with probabilities and additional information derived and learned at the system testing phase.
Keywords: runtime veriﬁcation, model-based runtime veriﬁcation, on-the-ﬂy ACTL/LTL model checking
1 Introduction
Model-driven Engineering (MDE) [11] is an eﬃcient software engineering approach
to complex systems development. According to MDE, we can follow three steps to
develop a (complex) system:
(i) model the system according to the system speciﬁcation,
(ii) verify the system model against the system speciﬁcation, and
(iii) synthesize the system implementation (source code) from the system model.
To ensure the correctness of a system under development, veriﬁcation techniques,
e.g., model checking, theorem proving, and validation techniques, e.g., simulation
1 This work is developed in the course of the Collaborative Research Center 614 - Self-Optimizing Concepts
and Structures in Mechanical Engineering - Paderborn University, and is published on its behalf and funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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and testing are usually applied respectively to check the system model against the
system speciﬁcation and the system implementation against the system speciﬁcation
as well as the consistency between the system implementation and the system model
as shown in Fig. 1 (theorem proving is not discussed in this paper).
Fig. 1. check correctness for system under development
However, for a complex system, simulation and testing only explore some of the
possible behaviors and scenarios of the system implementation. Although model
checking conducts an exhaustive exploration of all possible behaviors, it has to face
the state explosion problem. In addition, it is usually diﬃcult to decide if the set
of the system properties to be checked is complete or not.
In practice, diﬀerent checking methods are presented to complement each other
so that we could dig up more deep-corner errors in complex safety critical systems
and thus increase our conﬁdence to the correctness of the system implementation
and the system model as well as the consistency between them.
In contrast to the oﬄine checking techniques, the state-of-the-art runtime veri-
ﬁcation (Section 3) takes the system implementation and the system speciﬁcation
into account as shown in Fig. 2. The basic idea is to monitor the execution of the
system implementation and in the meantime to check the so far observed execution
trace against the system properties speciﬁed usually by LTL formulas.
Fig. 2. state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation framework
An actual state is usually monitored by means of instrumenting additional code
to some proper places in the source code of the system implementation. The vari-
ables contained in the system properties to be checked can help to decide what
variables need to be observed and where to add the corresponding instrumentation
code into the system source code. Notice that the number and the places of the
variables to be monitored might aﬀect the granularity of the transitions between the
monitored states as shown in Fig. 3. There usually exist some intermediate states
between two concatenated monitored states.
This kind of runtime veriﬁcation can only do post-checking, i.e., the checking
progress always falls behind the system execution because the checking procedure
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Fig. 3. actual execution trace and monitored execution trace
can continue only after a new state has been observed. Consequently, property
violations are usually detected after they have already happened.
Notice that even if the properties are checked correct with this approach, it does
not imply that the monitored execution trace conforms to the system model and
the system model satisﬁes the same properties as well. The former depends on the
consistency between the system implementation and the system model, while the
latter depends on the granularity of the system model and the properties to be
checked.
To overcome this problem, we extend this state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation to
our model-based runtime veriﬁcation [15,16] that takes the system implementation,
the system model and the system speciﬁcation together into account as shown in
Fig. 4. The basic idea is to check at runtime whether the monitored execution trace
of the system conforms to the system model on the one hand and if a partial system
model that covers the monitored states satisﬁes the system properties on the other
hand.
Fig. 4. model-based runtime veriﬁcation framework
Fig. 5. model-based runtime veriﬁcation procedure
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Here the partial system model is obtained by exploring only such kind of states
that can be reached from those current states monitored at runtime as shown in
Fig. 5. Intuitively, if this partial system model is checked correct against the system
speciﬁcation, and the monitored states conform to the corresponding states in the
partial system model, then we have more conﬁdence to the correctness of the actual
execution trace. It doesn’t matter even if the rest of the system model might still
contain some errors.
Because we check correctness at model level, this kind of runtime veriﬁcation
can make progress even if the current state of the system execution is not observed
yet. That is, it is possible for the model-based runtime veriﬁcation to run ahead
of the system execution and thus the property violations might be detected before
they have already occurred. In essence, the monitored (concrete) states are used to
locate the corresponding (abstract) states in the system model so as to reduce the
state space to be explored.
Therefore, the model-based runtime veriﬁcation can do pre-checking and post-
checking according to whether this runtime veriﬁcation takes the leading position
against the system execution or not. It looks as if the runtime veriﬁcation and the
system execution are involved into a two-player game. Of course, it is desirable that
the runtime veriﬁcation can run ahead of the system execution for as long time as
possible in the course of the game. For this purpose, we present two strategies to
make the runtime veriﬁcation have more chance or higher probability to win against
the system execution.
Notice that the properties to be checked here are requirements to the system
model and thus we do not need to concern ourselves with the problem of the granu-
larity of the transitions between the monitored states. In addition to LTL formulas,
our model-based runtime veriﬁcation can also check ACTL formulas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 ﬁrst introduces
the basic idea on the model-based runtime veriﬁcation and then presents the two
possible strategies to speed it up; Section 3 discusses the related work to the state-
of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation; and ﬁnally, Section 4 ends the paper with conclusion.
2 Model-based Runtime Veriﬁcation Framework
2.1 Problem Statement
Originally, we did present this mode-based runtime veriﬁcation technique [15,16]
to ensure the safety and consistency for self-optimizing mechatronic systems [9],
which consist of dynamic software components that can be optimized and even
reconﬁgured at runtime. Of course, the application of this technique is not limited
to such kind of dynamic systems. In this paper, we just take the self-optimizing
mechatronic systems as an application context to illustrate the basic idea on the
model-based runtime veriﬁcation.
We regard the model-based runtime veriﬁcation as a service of a Real-Time
Operating System (RTOS). Thus, a possible application scenario is that a real-time
system to be checked knows in advance when and where to trigger a model-based
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runtime veriﬁcation service. In the case of a self-optimizing mechatronic system, we
suppose that the system send a checking request to the RTOS (on which it runs)
some time before it actually does optimize or reconﬁgure itself. The operating
system then invokes the model-based runtime veriﬁcation service to check whether
the system optimization or reconﬁguration is safe or not. It is desirable if the
runtime veriﬁcation service could give a deﬁnite result before the optimization or
reconﬁguration is really done by the system.
Without loss of generality, let M = {M1,M2, · · · ,Mn} be a real-time system
model which contains n components M1,M2, · · · ,Mn running in parallel. M can
reconﬁgure itself at runtime by adding a new component M ′i to and/or removing an
existing component Mi from M . Without doubt, it is mandatory for M to remain
safe after this runtime reconﬁguration. Here we consider such safety properties
that can be speciﬁed as ACTL and/or LTL formulas. Notice that the discrete time
extensions to ACTL and LTL formulas are just shorthand notations to the usual
ACTL and LTL formulas [5].
Obviously, with the increase of the component number, the state space of the
overall system would be too large to be exhaustively explored by the oﬄine checking
techniques within a reasonable time and memory overhead. However, by runtime
veriﬁcation, instead of composing all the components together, we go to check each
individual component or some critical region in each component at runtime that
might be aﬀected by the reconﬁguration of the system.
Let tr be a time point at which a reconﬁguration request is sent to the RTOS
and t0 (t0 > tr) be a time point at which the system starts to really do the recon-
ﬁguration. During this time interval td = t0 − tr, the RTOS triggers the runtime
veriﬁcation service to check the safety of this system reconﬁguration. The main goal
of the model-based runtime veriﬁcation is to answer within the given time interval
td whether M still maintains safe after the reconﬁguration is really done. According
to this answer, the RTOS can decide to accept or reject the reconﬁguration request.
2.2 Pipelined Working Principle
Unfortunately, it is not possible under all circumstances to ﬁnish the checking pro-
cess before the reconﬁguration is really done by the system. To gain more checking
time, we make the model checking run interleaved with the execution of the re-
conﬁgurable system in a pipelined working manner. The sequence diagram Fig. 6
illustrates the cooperation between the safety checking (ACTL/LTL model check-
ing) and the reconﬁgurable system (real-time application).
Whenever the RTOS receives a checking request from the real-time application
at time point tr that the system wants to reconﬁgure itself at the time point t0, it
goes to invoke the veriﬁcation service to check whether the reconﬁguration is safe or
not. The answer has to be given within the required time interval td (= t0 − tr) in
this case. If lucky, the runtime veriﬁcation might complete the checking task before
the given time slot is over. However, it’s usually not the case for most complex
systems. Therefore, it is quite possible that, within this td time units (the ﬁrst
checking round), only the next Δt1 = t1 − t0 time steps starting from the initial
Y. Zhao, F. Rammig / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2009) 179–193 183
given states are checked Yes, which means that the reconﬁguration remains safe at
least up to the coming Δt1 time steps.
2 In this case, the RTOS does allow the real-
time application to make the reconﬁguration and execute forward Δt1 time steps.
During this period of time (the second checking round), the veriﬁcation service
continues to check, say the next Δt2 = t2 − t1 time steps. Correspondingly, the
real-time application can then go ahead the next Δt2 time steps. It is an essential
property of our approach that at each time point ti (i ≥ 0), the real-time application
reports its current (concrete) state, say s′i, to the veriﬁcation service. Let σ be a
mapping function from concrete states to abstract states of the system. With this
runtime information s′i, the veriﬁcation service can identify in the system model
the corresponding abstract state si = σ(s
′
i) and thus avoid searching the whole
state space of the system model by only checking a suﬃcient partial state space
reachable from this speciﬁc state si mapped from the concrete state s
′
i. In this way,
the working load of the safety checking can be reduced to a greater extent.
Fig. 6. pipelined working principle
On the other hand, if the veriﬁcation service could not map the concrete state s′i
to an appropriate abstract state, then it means that an inconsistency has happened.
If so, the runtime veriﬁcation will stop the checking process and inform the RTOS
to deal with this problem. If no inconsistency is checked out, this pipelined working
procedure will continue until one of the following three cases happens:
Case No: if at some time point an error is detected, the runtime veriﬁcation ter-
minates with the answer No to the RTOS.
Case Unknown: if at some time point, say tj , although the checking result is
positive, but the time interval tj+1− tj is not more than a pre-deﬁned time bound
2 Here a time step means a transition (step) at model level, which in turn represents some time units at
implementation level.
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tc, the minimal (time) distance that the runtime veriﬁcation is required to run
ahead of the real-time application, then, we give up the checking process and
report Unknown to the RTOS.
Case Yes: if a suﬃcient partial state space that covers the actual execution trace
of the real-time application is successfully checked, then, we report deﬁnitely Yes
to the RTOS and terminate the safety checking process (while still continuing the
consistency checking). From now on, the reconﬁgured system can execute safely
and consistently.
Notice that the ﬁrst two cases only mean that the detected errors might happen
in the future, because we check at model level and thus do not know whether
the errors are spurious or not. To avoid the errors really to happen, we have to
conservatively choose to reject the reconﬁguration request and inform the real-time
application that an error might emerge in the future. That is, the RTOS might
raise an exception together with a counterexample (if necessary). How to handle
the exception is application domain speciﬁc, thus we do not discuss this here.
The implementation of a component is in fact a reﬁnement of the model of the
component, i.e., the model is an abstraction of the implementation of the compo-
nent. Thus, an ACTL/LTL formula being true at the model level implies that it is
also true at the implementation level, while its being false at the model level does
not imply that it is also false at the implementation level. In this sense, our runtime
safety checking is conservative due to its being applied to the model level. However,
the beneﬁts of predicting and thus avoiding potential errors are gained just due to
its being applied to the model level.
In fact, Fig. 6 just demonstrates an ideal pipelined cooperation between the
reconﬁgurable system and the runtime veriﬁcation via the RTOS as intermediary
without considering any implementation details. To make this model-based runtime
checking feasible, the following preconditions are supposed to be true:
• Each component in the reconﬁgurable system should be modeled as a ﬁnite state
machine and be checked correct oﬀ-line under the given assumptions about the
environments, on which it depends, at the design phase.
• Time bound should be attached to the eventuality operators (if any) in the
ACTL/LTL formulas to be checked to avoid checking fairness conditions.
• The processing speed of the runtime veriﬁcation should be suﬃciently faster than
that of the reconﬁgurable system.
In addition, we also suppose that the implementation (source code) of each
component in the reconﬁgurable system is generated correctly from the model of
the corresponding component and is instrumented by appropriate code so as to
identify concrete states while the component is running.
2.3 Model Checking Methodology
It is easy to see that the pipelined working principle between the runtime veriﬁcation
and the system execution requires that safety checking should be done on-the-ﬂy in a
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top-down way as shown in Fig. 7. Each time an actual concrete state s′i is monitored
and successively mapped to the corresponding abstract state si in the system model
(by consistency checking), the runtime veriﬁcation needs to only explore the partial
state space starting from si.
Let M be a system model and f be an ACTL/LTL formula to be checked.
Both the ACTL and the LTL formulas can be transformed into (Bu¨chi) automata
by tableau construction [5]. Without loss of generality, let B be the automaton
constructed from f . In case that f is ACTL formula, in order to make ACTL
model checking done on-the-ﬂy in a top-down way, we go to check the simulation
pre-order between M and B incrementally [13], because M satisﬁes B if and only
if B simulates M . To do this, we encode the properties of the simulation relation
between M and B into a weakly negative Horn (NHORN) formula, a special type of
CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form) formula, and then check if the NHORN formula
is satisﬁable or not (called NHORNSAT problem) in polynomial time. [2] presents
an eﬃcient on-the-ﬂy algorithm to resolve HORNSAT problems, which receives one
Horn clause at a time and allows fast queries about the satisﬁability of the whole
formula so far received. The dualization of this algorithm also gives an eﬃcient
linear time on-the-ﬂy solution to the NHORNSAT problem. In case that f is LTL
formula, we do LTL model checking on-the-ﬂy by means of reachability analysis [12],
which is also suitable for liveness properties, such as absence of deadlock or livelock.
Of course, the above on-the-ﬂy approaches to ACTL and LTL model checking need
to be adapted and extended to ﬁt the pipe-lined working manner between the system
execution and runtime veriﬁcation. However, due to the space limitation, we refer
to [15] for more details although we have already updated the algorithms mentioned
there since then.
Fig. 7. On-the-ﬂy ACTL/LTL model checking methodology
A standalone prototype for runtime model checking invariants, LTL and ACTL
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properties is implemented. We have done some experiments for randomly generated
state transition graphs so far. The execution traces are also generated randomly
from the corresponding state transition graphs by simulation, which can simplify
the monitoring procedure to capture the runtime information (current states) used
for runtime model checking. In order to imitate the runtime veriﬁcation running
faster than the system execution, we make our runtime veriﬁer run more time than
the system execution does at each checking round. For example, if the speed of
the runtime veriﬁcation is supposed to be two times faster than that of the system
execution, then we make our runtime checker run two times more time than the
system execution does. In this way, we can estimate the performance of our model-
based runtime veriﬁcation to some degree.
According to our experience, it is good enough to make runtime veriﬁcation look
ahead two or three time steps at each checking round, for it takes not so much time
and memory overhead. At present, we plan to do further experiments using the
following two benchmarks:
• VLTS 3 benchmark suite derived from the communication protocols and concur-
rent systems in real life.
• BEEM 4 benchmark set derived from mutual exclusion algorithms, communica-
tion protocols and so on in research or industry area.
Obviously, the eﬃciency of our model-based runtime veriﬁcation is highly aﬀected
by the branching factors of the system models under test. It is worth noting that
the above benchmark models contain thousands or even millions of states, but the
average degrees of most of them are less than 10 and the highest average degree
among them is 40.
Compared to the usual (oﬀ-line) model checking, our model-based runtime ver-
iﬁcation can reduce the state space to be explored by using the monitored states
obtained while the system is running. On this view, the computational complexity
of the model-based runtime veriﬁcation is less than that of the traditional model
checking. Compared to the usual runtime veriﬁcation, our model-based runtime
veriﬁcation checks the system properties at the model level while just using the
monitored states to do consistency checking and then to shrink the state space to
be explored. As a result, the computational complexity of the model-based runtime
veriﬁcation is greater than that of the conventional runtime veriﬁcation. However,
if we make our model-based runtime veriﬁcation look ahead only several time steps
at each checking round, then its computational complexity in terms of time and
memory overhead will be closer to that of the state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation.
In addition, our model-based runtime veriﬁcation can check more general properties
speciﬁed by ACTL and/or LTL formulas, since [7] shows that the property patterns
to be checked in practice are usually not very complex.
3 http://www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/cadp/resources/
4 http://anna.fi.muni.cz/models/
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2.4 Game between Runtime Veriﬁcation and System Execution
2.4.1 Pre-checking and post-checking
Ideally, we wish that the model-based runtime veriﬁcation could always run enough
time steps ahead of the system execution. However, we have to face the reality that
the runtime veriﬁcation might fall behind the system execution. To deal with this
problem, we introduce two checking modes: pre-checking and post-checking. We
say that the runtime veriﬁcation is in pre-checking mode, if the runtime veriﬁcation
runs ahead of the system execution; otherwise, it is in post-checking mode.
In pre-checking mode, the runtime veriﬁcation can predict violations before they
really happen. In post-checking mode, violations can be detected after they have
already happened. In fact, the model-based runtime veriﬁcation can also predict
violations even in post-checking mode because our runtime veriﬁcation checks at
the model level. If an error is found at some place in the partial state space being
checked but without overlap with the monitored execution trace, then we can predict
that the error might happen in the future. In any case, both checking modes are
useful for safety-critical systems.
Notice that the model-based runtime veriﬁcation can observe the actual exe-
cution trace of the system once it falls behind the system running. This means
that the runtime veriﬁcation only needs to explore a rather small state space in
post-checking mode. Recall that the processing speed of the runtime veriﬁcation is
supposed to be faster than that of the system execution. Therefore, it is reasonable
to argue that there still exists chance for the runtime veriﬁcation to pass over the
system running quickly.
On this view, it seems as if the runtime veriﬁcation and the system execution are
involved into a two-player game. In the course of the game, we say that the runtime
veriﬁcation wins against the system execution, if the runtime veriﬁcation takes the
leading position for a longer time than the system execution does. To achieve this
purpose, we need to ﬁnd a better strategy to make the runtime veriﬁcation have
more chance or higher probability to win against the system execution.
Notice that the checking speed of the runtime veriﬁcation is heavily aﬀected by
the out-degrees of the states in the system model. Let d be a predeﬁned upper
bound for the out-degrees of the states in the system model. We say that a state is
critical, if the number of the outgoing transitions of the state exceeds the threshold
d.
Obviously, if there exist too many critical states in the system model, then the
system model becomes very broad. In this case, the runtime veriﬁcation could
only look ahead a short distance within the same time interval. To speed it up,
we’d better make the runtime veriﬁcation have some intelligence so that it can
intentionally reduce the state space to be checked whenever necessary.
2.4.2 Enrich system model with probabilities
Recall that the source code of the system implementation is usually validated by
simulation and testing. Therefore, we should learn some heuristic knowledge at the
Y. Zhao, F. Rammig / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 253 (2009) 179–193188
Fig. 8. derive probabilities from testing
system testing phase. For each critical state in the system model, we calculate how
many simulation traces go through this critical state and among these simulation
traces, we further calculate for each outgoing transition of this critical state how
many simulation traces pass through this transition. In this way, we can estimate
the probabilities of the outgoing transitions of the critical states in the system model
as shown in Fig. 8.
Of course, these probabilities might not be very accurate. In fact, we just
use them to set an initial order to the outgoing transitions of the critical states.
This order will be updated later at runtime. For each critical state si, we order
the outgoing transitions of si decreasingly according to the probabilities of these
transitions. We then classify the ﬁrst d transitions as the major transitions and the
rest as the minor transitions of si.
Let selected(si) be a set of the major transitions of si. During the checking
procedure, each time a critical state is reached, the runtime veriﬁcation can inten-
tionally explore only the transitions in selected(si). In this way, the state space
to be checked is reduced to some extent. The runtime veriﬁcation could thus look
ahead further even within a limited time interval. The selected transitions are the
major transitions of the critical states, which have higher probabilities than those
of the unselected transitions. Thus, the chance is high that the monitored states do
fall inside the selectively reduced state space having been checked safe.
Of course, we have to consider the worse case that the monitored states might
fall outside the intentionally reduced state space as shown in Fig. 9. Let sj be the
ﬁrst monitored state that falls outside the reduced state space and si be the critical
state inside the reduced state space and closest to sj. Then, we make the runtime
veriﬁcation switch to post-checking mode and continue the checking procedure from
si.
Meanwhile, the runtime veriﬁcation needs to adjust the selected transitions of
si. There are diﬀerent ways to do so. Let deviated(si) be a set of the transitions
from si that can reach sj. A way to update the selected transitions of si is to replace
some of the transitions in selected(si) with the transitions in deviated(si). Thus, if
the runtime veriﬁcation visits si again, it can intentionally explore the partial state
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Fig. 9. intentionally reduced state space
space covering sj .
2.4.3 Enrich system model with additional information
Notice that the system implementation is a reﬁnement of the system model. This
means that a concrete state in the system implementation usually contains more
information than the corresponding abstract state in the system model. Thus,
another strategy to speed up the runtime veriﬁcation is to add this extra information
to the related transition of the abstract state as shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. learn additional information from testing
Suppose that the two concrete states s′ and s′′ in the system implementation
map to the same abstract state s in the system model. If there exist a next state
of s′ mapping to s1 and a next state of s
′′ mapping to s3, then we add the extra
information a in s′ and b in s′′ to the transitions (s, s1) and (s, s3) respectively. In
this way, whenever s′ (or s′′) is monitored, the runtime veriﬁcation can reduce the
state space by only selecting the transition with the additional information a (or b).
However, adding too much extra information to the system model might increase
the complexity of the system model as well as the overhead of the communication
between the runtime veriﬁcation and the system execution. Therefore, we only add
the extra information to the critical states in the system model.
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3 Related Work
As mentioned in Section 1, the main characteristic of the state-of-the-art runtime
veriﬁcation is to monitor the actual executions of the program under test and then
check if the monitored execution traces conform to the required speciﬁcation.
Typically, [3] presents runtime checking for the behavioral equivalence between
a component implementation and its interface speciﬁcation by writing the inter-
face speciﬁcation in the executable AsmL so that one can synchronously run the
interface speciﬁcation and the component implementation while monitor if they are
equivalent on the observed behaviors; [1] presents runtime certiﬁed computation
whereby an algorithm not only produces a result for a given input, but also proves
that the result is correct with respect to the given input by deductive reasoning;
[14] presents runtime checking for the conformance between a concurrent imple-
mentation of a data structure and a high-level executable speciﬁcation with atomic
operations by ﬁrst instrumenting the implementation code to extract the execution
information into a log and then executing a veriﬁcation thread concurrently with
the implementation while using the logged information to check if the execution con-
forms to the high-level speciﬁcation; [4] presents monitoring-oriented programming
(Mop) as a light-weight formal method to check conformance of implementation to
speciﬁcation at runtime by ﬁrst inserting speciﬁcations as annotations at various
user selected places in programs and then translating the annotations into an eﬃ-
cient monitoring code in the same target language as the implementation during a
pre-compilation stage. Similar to Mop, Temporal Rover [6] is a commercial code
generator allowing programmers to insert speciﬁcations in programs via comments
and then generating from the speciﬁcations the executable veriﬁcation code, which
are compiled and linked as part of the application under test. In addition, Java
PathExplorer (JPaX) [10] is a runtime veriﬁcation environment for monitoring the
execution traces of a Java program by ﬁrst extracting events from the executing
program and then analyzing the events via a remote observer process.
What’s more, [8] extends the usual runtime veriﬁcation techniques to on-line
verify and steer a Discrete Event System (DES) by looking ahead into a partial
system model to predict violations and then applying steering actions to prevent
them. This method requires that the time delay for the DES to move from the
current state to the next state must be long enough so that the runtime checking
has suﬃcient time to explore a partial system model, which is generated after the
current state is known.
Recall that our model-based runtime veriﬁcation explores the system model
even before the current state is known and then shrinks the state space after the
current state is known. That is, the progress of our runtime veriﬁcation is not
strictly bound to the execution of the system implementation, i.e., it may run before
or after the system execution. As long as the processing speed is fast enough,
the runtime veriﬁcation could keep running certain time steps before the system
execution and then tell the system how many time steps ahead is safe. Also, our
runtime veriﬁcation can check more general properties speciﬁed by ACTL and/or
LTL formulas.
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4 Conclusion
Validation and veriﬁcation are widely-accepted techniques to ensure the correctness
of a system under development. Veriﬁcation checks the correctness of the system at
the model level while validation checks at the implementation level. State-of-the-art
runtime veriﬁcation combines veriﬁcation with system execution, aimed at checking
the consistency of a monitored execution trace against the system speciﬁcation by
passively observing an actual execution trace while the system is running. Notice
that in this approach even if the monitored execution trace is checked correct with
respect to the system properties, it does not mean that this monitored execution
trace really conforms to the system model and the system model satisﬁes the same
properties as well.
As an extension to this runtime veriﬁcation, our model-based runtime veriﬁca-
tion takes the system implementation, the system model and the system speciﬁ-
cation together into account. The basic idea is to check at runtime whether the
monitored execution trace of the system conforms to the system model on the one
hand and whether a partial system model that covers the monitored states satisﬁes
the system properties on the other hand. Due to its working at the model level,
our runtime veriﬁcation can make progress even if the current state of the system
running is not observed yet. In fact, the monitored states are used in consistency
checking and then used to shrink the state space to be checked by the runtime ver-
iﬁcation. Therefore, the model-based runtime veriﬁcation may run before or after
the system execution as if there exists a competition between them. In this sense,
our model-based runtime veriﬁcation is more ﬂexible than state-of-the-art runtime
veriﬁcation.
Of course, we have to pay some cost for this ﬂexibility. The computational
complexity of the model-based runtime veriﬁcation is less than that of the oﬄine
model checking but greater than that of the state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation.
However, our experience shows that it is good enough to have the model-based
runtime veriﬁcation look ahead only several time steps at each checking round,
which make its computational complexity in terms of time and memory overhead
much closer to that of the state-of-the-art runtime veriﬁcation.
In order to speed up our runtime veriﬁcation so that it can take the leading
position against the system execution for as long time as possible, two possible
strategies are presented for this runtime veriﬁcation to intelligently reduce the state
space to be explored whenever needed by making the system model enriched with
probabilities and additional information derived and learned at the system testing
phase. Considering that the property patterns to be checked in practice are usually
not very complex [7], we believe that the model-based runtime veriﬁcation can be
used to check more general properties speciﬁed by ACTL and/or LTL formulas.
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